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The most conspicuous feature of the new government under
the Federal Constitution was its division into three parts-the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. Experience has vin-
dicated that division, except, it may be, that some lack of
efficiency has shown itself in the absence of more useful coopera-
tion between the executive and the legislative branches. The
wisdom of keeping the executive and the legislative branches
apart from the judiciary has, however, been confirmed by the
event, not only under the American Constitution, but in England
and in all the states under her flag. In the United States, where
judicial systems have different degrees of this quality, permit-
ting comparison, the greater the independence of the courts the
stronger their influence, and the more satisfactory their juris-
diction and administration of justice.
In a popular government, the most difficult problem is to de-
termine a satisfactory method of selecting the members of its
judicial branch. Where ought such power to be placed? It is
a great one. It is said it ought not to be entrusted to irresponsi-
ble men. If this means that judges should not be men who do
not understand the importance of the function they are exercis-
ing, or the gravity of the results their decision may involve, or
do not exert energy and sincere intellectual effort to decide
according to law and justice, every one must concur. But if it
means that judges must be responsible for their judgments to
some higher authority, so that for errors made in good faith they
incur a personal liability, then we know from centuries of
actual experience that the interest of justice, pure and undefiled,
requires their immunity. Finality of decision is essential in
every branch of the government, or else government cannot go
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on. This is as true of its judicial branch as of other branches.
Therefore, somebody must have the final word in judicial mat-
ters, and the only question is who can best exercise this power.
The answer to the question must be found in the real character
of the function which the judges are to perform.
There is a school of political philosophers today who say that
there are no positive standards of right and justice, but that
these vary with the popular will, and that we are to learn what
they are from its expression.
If right and justice are dependent on the votes of the elector-
ate, and if what are known as individual rights are merely
privileges held at the will of a majority, then the proposition
that the judicial officer represents the people in the same sense
as the executive officer, so that when the electoral majority differs
from his judgment he ought to be removed, has some logical
foundation. So, too, in this view, the proposition that the final
decision of the courts shall be submitted on review to a popular
election has reason in it.
But I shall assume, for the purposes of this discussion, that
principles *of right and justice and honesty and morality are not
merely conventional and have a higher source than a plebiscite.
There is a broad field for the proper exercise of legislative
power in prescribing rules of human conduct, and it is the func-
tion of courts to interpret them. This is the work of trained
lawyers who know the theory and purpose of government, who
are familiar with previous statutes, and who understand legisla-
tive methods of expression so that they can put themselves in the
attitude of the legislature when it acted. When it is the duty of
a court to say whether what was enacted by the legislature under
the forms of law is within its power, it must discharge a delicate
duty and one requiring in its members ability, learning and
experience properly to interpret both the seeming law and the
constitution, and properly to measure what was within the per-
missible discretion of the legislature in construing its own
authority. The majority of questions before our courts, how-
ever, are neither statutory nor constitutional, but are dependent
for decision upon the common or customary law handed down
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from one generation to another, adjusted to new conditions of
society, and declared from time to time by courts as cases arise.
Thorough study is required to enable a judge to know and un-
derstand the whole range of legal principles that have thus to
be discriminatingly adapted and applied. Work of this kind
requires professional experts of the highest proficiency, who
have mastered the law as a science and in practice.
Where are we to get such experts? When a man of high char-
acter, ability, and intelligence is to be selected for the chief
executive office, the electorate can be safely charged with elect-
ing one from the necessarily few candidates who are sufficiently
prominent. But what of the searching out in a large profession
the best expert, the man with real learning, with judicial tem-
perament, with keenness of perception, with power of analysis
and nice distinction, with large technical experience? Can he
be found better by election or by appointment? There can be
but one answer to this query. The selection can be really popu-
lar without resorting to an election. The chief executive elected
by the people to represent them in executive work does, in
appointing a judge, execute the popular will. He can search
among the members of the Bar and can inform himself
thoroughly as to the one best qualified. Generally he has
sources of information, both of an open and a confidential char-
acter, and if he is not himself a lawyer or personally familiar
with the qualifications of the candidates he has an Attorney-
General and other competent advisers to aid him in the task.
For these reasons, in every country of the world, except in the
Cantons of Switzerland and the United States, judges are ap-
pointed and not elected. With us, in the decade between 1845 and
1855, when new constitutions were being adopted in many states,
a change was made to the elective system. It was not an improve-
ment. In some states the change was not made. A comparison
between the work of the appointed judges and of the elected
judges shows that appointmicnt secures in the long run a higher
average of experts for the Bench. The principle of the short
ballot, which is much put forward nowadays by reformers, and
which thus far is much more honored by them in the breach than
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in the observance, really limits the election by the people to the
chief executive and to legislators, and delegates to the elected
executive the appointment of all other officers, including the
judiciary. The executive who makes the appointments is properly
held responsible to the public for the character of his selections.
We have had many able judges by popular election. These
have owed their preferment to several circumstances. The effect
of the old method of appointment was visible in the working of
the new system for a decade or more, and good judges were con-
tinued by general acquiescence. In some states, indeed, the
practice of re-electing judges without contest obtained until
within recent years. Moreover, able judges have been nominated
often through the influence of leading members of the Bar upon
the politicians who controlled the nominations. Shrewd political
leaders have not ordinarily regarded a judgeship as a political
place, because the office has had comparatively little patronage.
If the nominee has been a man of high quality, conspicuously
fit, commanding the support of the professional and intelligent
non-partisan votes, it has tended to help the rest of the ticket
to success. The instances of great and able judges who have
been placed on the Bench by election are instances of the adapta-
bility of the American people and their genius for making the
best out of bad methods, and are not a vindication of the
system. That has resulted in the promotion to the judicial office
of other judges who have impaired the authority of the courts
by their lack of strength, clearness, and courage, and who have
shown neither a thorough knowledge of the customary law, nor
a constructive faculty in the application of it. Great judges and
great courts distinguish between the fundamental and the casual.
They make the law to grow not by changing it, but by adapting
it, with an understanding of the progress in our civilization, to
new social conditions. It is the judges who are not grounded in
the science of the law, and who have not the broad statesman-
like view that comes from its wide study, that are staggered by
narrow precedent and frightened by technical difficulty. The
decisions of courts criticised for a failure to respond to that
progress in settled public opinion which should affect the limita-
HeinOnline  -- 36 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 421 1913
SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES.
tions upon the police power, or the meaning of due process of
law, have generally been rendered by elected courts. Paradox
as it may seem, the appointed judges are more discriminatingly
responsive to the needs of a community and to its settled views
than judges chosen directly by the electorate, and this because
the executive is better qualified to select greater experts.
More than.half a century's experience with the election of
judges has not, therefore, commended it as the best method,
though, for the reasons stated, its results up to this time are
better than might have been expected. But with the changes
proposed in the manner of making nominations and of conduct-
ing elections of judges the system is certain to become less satis-
factory. Now we are to have no state or county or district con-
vejitions, and the jtdges are to be nominated by a plurality in
a popular primary, and to be voted for at the election on a non-
partisan ticket, without party emblems, or anything else to guide
the voter. Like all the candidates for office to be elected under
such conditions, they are expected to conduct their own canvass
for their nomination, to pay the expenses of their own candi-
dacy in the primary, and in so far as any special effort is to be
made in favor of their nomination and election, they are to make
it themselves. They are necessarily put in the attitude of sup-
plicants before the people for preferment to judicial places.
Under the convention system it happened not infrequently, for
reasons I have explained, that men who were not candidates were
nominated for the Bench, but now in no case can the office seek
the man. Nothing could more impair the quality of lawyers
available as candidates or depreciate the standard of the judi-
ciary. It has been my official duty to look into the judiciary of
each state, in my search for candidates to be appointed to federal
judgeships, and I affirm without hesitation that in states where
many of the elected judges in the past have had high rank, the
introduction of nomination by direct primary has distinctly in-
jured the character of the Bench for learning, courage and abil-
ity. The nomination and election of a judge are now to be the
result of his own activity and of fortuitous circumstances. If
the judge's name happens to be the first on the list, either at
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the primary or the election, he is apt to get more votes than
others lower down on the list. The incumbent in office, because
he happens to be more widely known, has a great advantage.
Newspaper prominence plays a most important part, though
founded on circumstances quite irrelevant in considering judicial
qualities.
The result of the present tendency is seen in the disgraceful
exhibitions of men campaigning for the place of state supreme
judge and asking votes, on the ground that their decisions will
have a particular class flavor. This is the logical development
of the view that a popular election is the only basis for deter-
mining right and justice; but it is so shocking, and so out of
keeping with the fixedness of moral principles which we learned
at our mother's knee, and which find recognition in the con-
science of every man who has grown ..up under proper influence,
that we ought to condemn without stint a system which can
encourage or permit such demagogic methods of securing judicial
position. Through the class antagonism unjustly stirred up
against the courts, fiery faction is now to be introduced into the
popular election of judges. Men are to be made judges not be-
cause they are impartial, but because they are advocates; not
because they are judicial, but because they are partisan.
It is true that politics have played a part even when judges
have been appointed. They have usually been taken from the
lawyers of the prevailing party. The president or a governor
appointing them has been elected on a partisan ticket, is the
titular head of his party, and is expected to give preferment to
those who supported him. This has not, however, resulted in
political courts, because the control of the government has
naturally changed from one party to another in the course of a
generation and has normally brought to the Bench judges
selected from both parties; and then, if the judges are made
independent by the character of their tenure, the continued
exercise of the judicial function entirely neutralizes in them any
possible partisan tendency arising from the nature of their
appointment.
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More than this, there is a noticeable disposition on the part
of some chief executives to disregard party in making judicial
appointments, and this ought to be so. In the early history of
our country, and indeed down to the Civil War, the construction
of the Constitution as to the powers of the federal government
was a party question, and doubtless affected the selection of
federal judges. Yet the effect of the judgments of Marshall
and his court was not weakened by Taney. and his Democratic
associates when they came to consider the constitution. The
Federalist party died in 1800, but its national view of our
government was vitalized by John Marshall, and preserved by
the Supreme Court in unchanged form until the Civil War
robbed the state's rights issue of its political and sectional im-
portance. Today a sound and eminent lawyer of either party
who can conscientiously take the oath to support the Constitu-
tion may be appointed by a conscientious executive. What is
true of the National Government is true of the state govern-
ments, and there is not the slightest reason why an executive
should not appoint to the judiciary of his state qualified persons
from either party.
I come now to consider what should be the judicial tenure
of office. In our federal and state Constitutions the rights of the
individual as against the aggression of a majority of the elec-
torate, and, therefore, against the government itself, are declared
and secured in a way peculiar to our Anglo-Saxon ancestors.
The abstract declarations in favor of personal liberty and the
right of property in the fundamental law of the continental
countries were often as ample as in ours, but it was in the pro-
vision for the specific procedure to secure them that the early
English charters of freedom, the Magna Charta, the Petition
of Right and the Bill of Rights, were remarkable. This pro-
cedure is preserved in our constituitions and upon the initiative
of the individual who conceives his rights infringed, is to be in-
voked in the courts. Therefore, the first requisite of. the
judiciary is independence of those branches through the aggres-
sion of which the rights of the individual may be impaired. The
choice of the judges must always rest either in a majority of the
HeinOnline  -- 36 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 424 1913
WILLIAM H. TAFT.
electorate of the people, or in a popular agent whom that major-
ity selects, and so must be directly or indirectly in control of the
party to be charged in such controversies with the infringement
of individual rights. How, therefore, can we secure a tribunal
impartial in recognizing such infringements and courageous
enough to nullify them? It is only by hedging around the tenure
of the judges after their selection with an immunity from the
control of a temporary majority in the electorate and from the
influence of a partisan executive or legislature.
Our forefathers who made the Federal Constitution had this
idea in their minds as clear as the noonday sun, and it is to be
regretted that in some of their descendants and of the succes-
sors in their political trust this sound conception has been
clouded. They provided that the salaries of the judges should
not be reduced during their terms of office, and that they should
hold office during good behavior, and that they should only be
removed from office through impeachment by the House of
Representatives and a trial by the Senate. The inability of
Congress or of the Executive, after judges have been appointed
and confirmed, to affect their tenure has given to the federal
judiciary an independence that has made it a bulwark of the
liberty of the individual. On the other hand, this immunity
has had some effect in making Congress grudge any betterment
of the compensation to these great officers of the law. Congress
has failed to recognize the increased cost of living as a reason
fok increasing judicial salaries, although this fact has furnished
the ground for much other legislation. They have declined to
conform the income of the judges to the dignity and station in
life which they ought to maintain, and have kept them at so
low a figure as to require from that class of lawyers who are
likely to furnish the best candidates for judicial career a great
pecuniary self-sacrifice in accepting appointment. I presume,
therefore, that in spite of the efforts of the Bar and of men of
affairs to increase judicial salaries, and in spite of the confession
as to the cost of living in Washington that actual service in the
government wrings from the advocates of a simple life who hap-
pen to get into office, we must continue to require from those
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who have the honor, the responsibility and the labor of the
exercise of judicial functions under the federal government,
mean living and high thinking, and we must endure the indigna-
tion that is justly stirred in us when widows and children of
men, able and patriotic, who have served their country faith-
fully and have done enormous labor for two or three decades on
the Bench, are left without sufficient means to live. Nothing
but the life tenure of the federal judiciary, its independence and
its power of usefulness have made it possible, with such inade-
quate salaries, to secure judges of a high average in learning,
ability and character.
When judges were only agents of the King to do his work,
it was logical that they should hold office at his pleasure. Now,
when there is a recrudescence of the idea that the judge is a
mere agent of the sovereign to enforce his views as the only
standards of justice and right, we naturally recur to the theory
that judges should hold their office at the will of the present
sovereign, to wit, the controlling majority or minority of the
electorate. The judicial recall is a case of atavism and is a
retrogression to the same sort of tenure that existed in the time
of James I, Charles I, Charles II and James II, until its abuses
led to the act of settlement securing to judges a tenure during
their good behavior. It is argued that there is no reason to
object to a recall of judges that does not apply to judges elected
for a term of years. The answer is that the conceded objections
to an elective judiciary holding for a short term of years are
doubled in force in their application to. judicial recall. The
states which have elective judges have gotten along somehow
through the political capacity of the American people and the
force of public opinion to make almost any system work. Under
the present system a judge is certain to retain his position for a
few years, and during that time at least he is -free from inter-
ruption or the threat of popular disapproval. This certainty of
tenure, though short, conduces to the independent administra-
tion of his office. As he draws near another election and hopes
to have another term, it is true that his courage and his im-
partial attitude toward issues that have any political bearing are
HeinOnline  -- 36 Annu. Rep. A.B.A. 426 1913
WILLIAM H. TAFT.
likely to be severely tested. Because the country has survived a
judiciary largely selected in this manner does not seem to be a
very strong reason why we should proceed to increase the evil
effect of the short tenure by making it merely at the will of the
plurality of those of the electorate who choose to vote.
I have stated my reasons for thinking that appointment of
judges results in the selection of better experts in the science
of law than the elective system. But even if the qualifications
of the two incumbents under the two systems were equal upon
their accession to office, the longer experience afforded by the
life tenure and the greater opportunity it gives to learn the
judicial duties make the better average judges. It matters not
how experienced a man may be in the learning of the law, and
in its practice, there are still lessons before him which he must
learn before he can become of the greatest public service.
Other benefits from the life tenure in its effect upon the judges
who enjoy it are that it makes the incumbents give their whole
mind to their work, to order their household with a view to
always being judges, and to take vows, so to speak, as to their
future conduct. They must put aside all political ambition. One
of the great debts which the American people owe to Mr. Justice
Hughes is the example that he set in the last presidential elec-
tion when the most serious consideration was being given to
making him the candidate of the Republican party. He an-
nounced his irrevocable determination not to enter the political
field because he had assumed the judicial ermine.
What, now, are the objections urged to a life tenure? The first
is that it makes judges irresponsible, in the sense that they are so
freed from the effect of what people think of them that they are
likely to do unjust and arbitrary things. The immunity of life
tenure does make some judges forget that it is nearly as essential
to give the appearance of doing justice as it is to do substantial
justice. They forget that the public must have confidence in and
respect for the courts in order that they achieve their highest
usefulness in composing dangerous differences and securing
tranquillity and voluntary acquiescence in the existing order.
Still, the life.judges in whom these faults really exist are com-
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paratively few. The criticism is apt to be made in many cases
where it is not deserved, because of the contrast that lawyers
and litigants find in dealing with courts under the two systems.
The federal judges have the power which the English judges
have. They are so far removed from politics or the fear of elec-
tion that the counsel before them exercise only the authority
which their eminence as lawyers justifies. Under state statutes,
following the tendency to minimize the power of the court, the
judge is greatly restricted in the exercise of discretion to free
the issue before the court from irrelevant and confusing con-
siderations. The jury trial given by the federal constitution is
the trial at common law given by a court and jury, in which the
court exercises the proper authority in the mahagement of the
trial and assists the jury in a useful analysis and summing up.
of the evidence, and an expression of such opinions as will help
the jury to reach right conclusions. All this tends to eliminate
much of what almost might be called demagogic discussion which
counsel are prone to resort to in many of the local state courts
and which the state judge fears to limit, lest it be made the
basis of error and a ground for new trial under some statute
narrowing his useful power. We must, therefore, weigh the
frequent characterization of the federal judge as a petty tyrant
in the light of the contrast between proper authority exercised
by him and the control exercised by judges in state courts, where
opportunity is too frequently given to the jury to ignore the
charge of the court, to yield to the histrionic eloquence of
counsel, and to give a verdict according to their emotions instead
of their reason and their oaths. Why. is it that every law-breaker
prefers to be tried in a state court? Why is it that the federal
courts are the terror of evil-doers? One of the reasons may be
found in the better organization of the federal prosecuting sys-
tem. But is it not chiefly because the judge retains his traditional
control of the manner of the trial and of the counsel and really
helps, but does not constrain, the jury to a just verdict? Is it not
because law and justice more certainly prevail there rather than
buncombe and mere sentiment?
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But it is said that the unpopularity of the federal courts
among the lawyers as a whole shows that the life tenure has a
bad effect upon their character as judges. I agree that when a
judge is thoroughly disliked by the Bar, who are his ministers
and assistants, it is generally his fault, because he has much
opportunity properly to cultivate their good-will and respect.
Still, much must be allowed for in the impatience of the general
Bar at federal judges, because there are many lawyers who
appear but rarely in United States courts, are embarrassed by
their unfamiliarity with the mode of practice, and feel them-
selves in a strange and alien forum.
There are substantial causes for the local unpopularity of
federal courts and these exist without any fault of the judges.
The chief reason for creating local courts under the federal
authority was to give to non-residents an opportunity to have
their cases tried in a court free from local prejudice before a
judge who had the commission of the President of the whole
country, rather than a judge whose mandate was that of the
governor of the state where the cause was tried, or of the people
of the county in which the court was held. In other words, the
very office which they serve, that of neutralizing local prejudice,
necessarily brings them more or less into antagonism with the
people among whom such local prejudice exists.
A similar answer may be made to the charge against the
-federal courts, that they are biased in favor of corporations.
This has grown naturally out of their peculiar jurisdiction.
Throughout the western and southern states, foreign capital has
been expended for the purpose of development and in the inter-
est of the people of those sections. They have been able to
secure these investments on reasonable terms by the presence in
their communities of the federal courts, where the owners of
foreign capital think themselves secure in the maintenance of
their just rights when they are obliged to resort to litigation.
While this has been of inestimable benefit in rapid settlement
and progress, it has not conduced to the popularity of the federal
courts. Men borrow with avidity, but pay with reluctance, and
do not look upon the tribunal that forces them to. pay with any
degree of love or approval.
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Then, an important part of the litigation in the federal courts
on the civil side consists of suits brought to prevent infringe-
ment by state action of the right of property secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Such- action is
usually directed against large corporations, who thus beconife
complainants. If any such suits are successful, and state action
is enjoined, it is easy for the demagogue and the muckraker to
arouse popular feeling by assertion that the federal courts are
prone to favor corporate interests. It is not the bias of the
judges, but the nature of their jurisdiction, that properly
leads litigants of this kind to seek the federal forum. The
'unsuccessful suits of this kind are never considered by the
critics of the federal judiciary. Hence the plausibility of the
charge. But it is unjust. In no other courts have the prosecu-
tion of great corporations by the government been carried on
with such success and such certainty of judgment for the wrong-
doer, and the influence of powerful financial interests has had
.no weight with the federal judges to prevent the enforcement of
law against them.
Again, the litigation between non-resident railway and other
corporations and their employes in damage suits has usually been
removed from the state courts to the federal courts, where a
more rigid rule of law limiting the liability of the employer has
been enforced. This has created a sense of injustice and friction
in local communities that is entirely natural, and has given
further support to the charge that the federal courts are the
refuge of great corporations from just obligation. It was the
business of Congress to remove this by adopting an interstate
commerce employers' liability act like that which is now on the
statute book, giving the employes much fairer treatment, and by
*passing the workman's compensation bill which is pending in
Congress and will I hope soon be enacted into law.
But it is said, "When you get a bad judge you cannot get rid
of him under the life system." That is true unless he shows
his unworthiness in such a way as to permit his removal by
impeachment. Under the authoritative construction by the
highest court of impeachment, the Senate of the United States.
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a high misdemeanor for which a judge may be removed is mis-
conduct involving bad faith or wantonness or recklessness in his
judicial action or in the use of his judicial influence for ulterior
purpose. The last impeachment and removal of a federal judge,
that of Judge Arehbald, was on the ground that he sought sales
of property from railroad companies, or their subsidiary cor-
porations, which were likely to be litigants in his court, and
indicated clearly by a series of transactions of this sort his hope
and purpose that such companies would be moved to comply
with his request because of his judicial position. The trial and
the judgment were most useful in demonstrating to all incum-
bents of the federal Bench that they must be careful in their
conduct outside of court as well as in the court itself, and that
they must not use the prestige of their judicial position, directly
or indirectly, to secure personal benefit. Mr. Justice Chase was
tried in Jefferson's time for gross improprieties of a partisan
political character calculated to cast discredit on his court. It
would seem in this day and generation that he ought to have
been removed, but the spirit of the impeachers was so partisan.
and political that it frightened many of the Senators and
neutralized the improprieties that were made the subject of the
impeachment articles. It was this case which evoked from
Thomas Jefferson the comment that impeachment was "the
scarecrow" of the Constitution, and that it was impracticable
as a means of disciplining judges. Under the ruling in the
Archbald case and the evident tendency of the Senate, the criti-
cism of Jefferson has lost much of its force.
The procedure in impeachment is faulty, because it takes up
the time of the Senate in long-drawn-out trials. This fact is apt
to discourage resort to the remedy and has lessened its proper
admonitory and disciplinary influence. The pressure upon both
Houses for legislation is so great that the time needed for in-
quest and trial is grudgingly given. An impeachment court of
judges has been suggested, but the public would fear in it lenity
toward old associates. The wisdom of having the trial by the
higher branch of the Congress, entirely free from the spirit of
the guild, commended itself -to the framers of the Constitution
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and is manifest. A change in the mode of impeachment, how-
ever, so as to reduce materially the time required of the Senate
in the proceeding would be of the greatest advantage. If the
whole Senate were not required to sit in the actual trial, and the
duty were remitted to a committee like the judiciary committee
of that body, whose decision could be carried on review to the
Senate in full session, the procedure might be much shortened.
The Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council is now a
supreme court for colonial appeals, probably having its origin in
the difficulty of assembling the whole Council to attend to litigated
causes. The English House of Lords is a court, but sits only
with the Law Lords, who are really a judiciary committee of the
Peers to act as such.
It has been proposed that instead of impeachment, judges
should be removed by a joint resolution of the House and the
Senate, in analogy to the method of removing judges in England
through an address of both Houses to the King. This provision
occurs in the Constitution of Massachusetts and in that of some
other states, but it is very clear that this can only be justly done
after full defense, hearing and argument. Professor MIcIlwain
of Harvard has written a very instructive article on the subject
of removal by address in England, in which he points out that
this is a most formal method, and that in the only case of actual
removal of a judge by this method a hearing was had before both
Houses of Parliament quite as full, quite as time-consuming
and quite as judicial as in the proceeding by impeachment. Ad-
vocates of the preposterous innovation of judicial recall have
relied upon the method of removal of judges as a precedent, but
the reference only shows a failure on the part of those who make
it to understand what the removal by address was.
By the liberal interpretation of the term "high misdemeanor,"
which the Senate has given it, there is now no difficulty in secur-
ing the removal of a judge for any reason that shows him
unfit, and if the machinery for holding the trial could be
changed from the full Senate to a judicial committee, with the
possible appeal to the whole body, impeachment would become a
remedy entirely practical and effective.
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One who is convinced that the federal judiciary, both supreme
and inferior, because they are appointed and hold office for life,
are the greatest bulwark in the protection of individual right
and individual liberty and the permanent maintenance of just
popular government, must have a strong personal resentment
against any member of that body who in any way brings dis-
credit on the federal judiciary and weakens its claim to public
confidence. I feel, therefore, no leniency or disposition to save
the federal judges from just criticism and I am far from making
light of serious charges against them or of defects that have
cropped out from time to time.
Some local federal judges are not sufficiently careful to avoid
arousing local antagonism in cases where they have a choice as
to the method of granting a suitor relief. Congress has taken
steps in this direction so that one judge is not enough to author-
ize an injunction where it is sought to prevent the enforcement
of a state statute claimed to violate individual rights.
Again, the patronage that judges have exercised has disclosed
a weakness that can be prevented by changing the system.
Judges now appoint clerks and the relation established between
the judge and the clerk is so close and confidential that it is
often difficult to secure from the judge'the proper attitude of
criticism toward the clerk's misconduct. I am convinced that
the clerks ought to be appointed by the Executive, be brought
within the classified civil service, and be subject to removal for
cause either by the Executive or by the judge.
Abuses have grown out of court appointments to receiverships
and to other temporary lucrative positions. It would be well if
possible to relieve the judges of such duties. In the case of
national banks, the receivers are appointed not by the courts,
but by the Comptroller of the Currency. I think it might be
well in the case of interstate railroads, the creditors of which
seek relief in the federal court, to have the receivers appointed
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Patronage is very
difficult to dispense. It gives to the court a meretricious power
and casts upon it a duty that is quite likely to involve the court
in controversies adding neither to its dignity nor its hold upon
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the confidence of the public. Some great English judges have
tarnished their reputation in its use. A receiver appointed by
another authority would be quite sufficiently under control of the
court if the court could remove him for cause and punish him
for contempt of its orders.
Again, the judges have not shown as strong a disposition to
cut down the expenses of litigation as they should in the federal
courts; but this is completely in the control of Congress, which
would help the people much more by enacting a proper fee bill
than by such attempts as we have seen, to impair the power of
courts to enforce their lawful decrees. The attitude of the
federal courts as to the cost of litigation was originally brought
about by the increase in litigation and the hope that heavy costs
would operate as a limitation, but this works great injustice and is
an improper means to the end.
The great defects in the administration of justice in our coun-
try are in the failure to enforce the criminal laws through
delay and ineffectiveness of prosecution in the criminal courts,
and in the cost and lack of dispatch in civil suits. In the en-
forcement of the criminal laws of the United States in the federal
cour'ts-there is little to criticise. They might well serve as models
to the state courts. On' the civil side, the same cannot be said.
The costs may be and ought to be greatly reduced. The pro-
cedure in equity causes has been greatly simplified by the new
equity rules just issued by the Supreme Court. A bill to- author-
ize that court to effect the same result in cases at law is likely
soon to pass. Then we may hope that the federal courts will
furnish a complete object lesson to state legislatures in cheap,
speedy, and impartial judgment.
I have thus taxed your patience with the reasons that con-
vince me that appointment and a life tenure are essential to a
satisfactory judicial system. They may seem trite and obvious,
but I have thought in the.present disposition to question every
principle of popular' government that has prevailed for. more
than a century, that it might be well, at the' risk of being com-
monplace, to review them.
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In the present attitude of many of the electorate toward the
courts it is perhaps hopeless to expect the states, in which judges
are elected for short terms, to return to the appointment of
judges for life. But it is not in vain to urge its advantages.
The federal judges are still appointed for life, and it will be a
sad day for our country if a change be made either in their mode
of selection or the character of their tenure. These are what
enable the federal courts to secure the liberty of the individual
and to preserve just popular judgment.
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